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PREJUDGMENT: AN UNAVAILABLE CHALLENGE TO
OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Charles H. Koch, Jr. *
ROFESSOR DAVIS URGES THAT DISCRETION , not tyra nny , necessa rily takes
P over
where law ends. ' It is the quality and integrity of the men who exer-

cise discretion , and not the structural framework in which it is exercised ,
whi ch measures the fairness of administrative action ; for no structura l imperatives can assure justice and fairness nearly so well as institutionalized
imperatives of honesty and integrity. Moreover, structure tends to stultify the
administrative process and substantially interfere with the equitable nature
of its operation .
Thus, discretion is the cornerstone of the administrative process and
the working principle whi ch is both its strongest point a nd its major point
of controversy. One of the problems of the exercise of discretion is purity
of motive. The exercise of discretion usually raises some question as to
whether the action has been the result of a weighing of the equities in the
particular situation or the result of preconceived notions or extra neous
pressures.
Consequently, a pervasive question in review of administrative decisionmaking is the possibility of prejudgment. A challenge of prejudgment in an
administrative decisionma king is invariably a vaila ble to a dissatisfied party .
Unfortunately, such challenges, though r arely successful , do result in delay
of agency action, often enough to encourage continued attempts. This article
attempts to analyze and categorize the leading prejudgment decisions. Hopefully, through this analysis, agencies will learn to avoid charges of illegal
prejudgment, a nd some prediction of the chances of success of various types
of prejudgment challenges can be made , perhaps di scouraging certa in of the
more frivolous challenges by the administrative law ba r .
ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES
In order to better understand prejudgment, it is necessary to recognize
the various forms it may take. The categories below a re inferred from judicial
decisions and commentators' remarks.
There are two major means of distinguishing prejudgment problems.
First is the type of issue prejudged. The types of issues can be distinguished
as (1) broad policy or legal theory, (2) general facts , or (3) specific facts. 2

' Attorney, Office of the Genera l Co un se l, Federa l Tra de Co mmission .
l D av i s, DI SC Rf-: TI O!'; /\RY J USTI CE : A PR E UMI N t\RY I!':Qu IR Y ( 1969).
~ Professor

Davi s di stingui shed facts as "legislative" and "adjudicative ":

The ca rdi na l distin ction whi ch more tha n a ny other govern s the li se o f cx tra- fc(.' ord facts by

agencies is the distinction bet ween legislati ve facts and adjudicati ve facts. When a court or an

a~ n ('y

COlirt s

and

find s facts

concerning the immedia te parties- wh o did w ha t, where , w hen, how a nd with w hat mo ti ve or int ent - the ('ourt
or age ncy is performing a n adj udica ti ve fun f li on, a nd the facts are convenientl y ca lled adjudicative facts. \tVhen

a court or an agency develops Jawor policy , it is acting legislati vely; the (Ourls have <Teated the fo mmon law
throu gh judicia l legisla tion , a nd the facts whi ch form the tribuna l's legisla ti ve judgment a re called legisla ti ve facts.
2 DA VIS, A DMI NISTRATIV E LAW TR EATISE, §I S. 03 a t 353. (H ereina fter cited as DAVIS.)

2 18
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The second major distinction involves the context in which the alleged
prejudgment arises. Bias may arise either in the context of an institutional
decisionmaking process (which may involve one or more individuals) or in a
purely individual context. The context of the decisionmaking appears to be
the key factor for the courts in determining whether alleged bias constitutes
illegal prejudgment.
DISTINCTION ON THE BASIS OF THE TYPES OF ISSUES

A. A cceptance of Bias as to General Policy and Legal Theory
The most pervasive type of issue bias is the prejudgment of basic
philosophical or legal issues raised in a proceeding. Everyone recognizes
that decisionmakers at every level possess preconceptions which affect their
interpretation of facts and direct their decisions. This sort of prejudgment is
never considered as grounds for overturning a decision. Judge Frank may
have said all that is necessary: "If ... 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to
mean the total absence of preconception in the mind of the judge, then no one
has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will."3
Administrative agencies are created to fill the need for decisions based
not on legalisms but on notions of how the system should work.4 Hence,
policy bias-broad theory prejudgments-on the part of the members of an
agency is more than permissible, it is imperative.
The propriety of broad theory or policy bias in administrative agencies
is well established in the law. The Supreme Court in United States v. MorganS said, "[c]abinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are.
Both may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case."6
Similarly in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, the Circuit Court said, "[W]e do not expect a Trade Commissioner to be neutral on anti-monopoly policies." 7 Obviously, bias as to an "underlying philosophy" does not concern the courts.

B. Permissible Understanding and Opinion of General Facts
The second type of issue bias relates to general facts. For the purpose of
this analysis, general facts are to be considered any facts which apply generally to an industry or other recognizable class. The result of the synthesis
of these general facts with broad policy orientation or theory is the establishment of a policy towards an industry or class. Indeed, broad policy and

' In re J. P. Linaha n, Inc .. 138 F .2d 650. 65 1 (2d Cir. 1943).
IA N EW R Et: Ul.i\ TO H Y FR AMEW OR K, R EPO RT O !\,i SELECTE D b; D E P E~DE;\;T R EG C L·\TO RY AGE:\" C IE S (The HAsh Commission" Report ) a t 13 (197 1); TI-IE H OO \ ' ER COMMT SSIO X RE PO RT 0<'> Til E OR G A:,\IZATl Ol'\ O F THE E XECCTIV E BRA:"II C H O F
GO V E R N MENT at 430 (1949). Also:
" Since the members of the agency a nd the statutorily designated officers were speciall y selected for the fun ctions
th ey were to perrorm . Congress probably reposed confidence in their experience a nd expertness. It doubtless did not
wish to disorga nize administra ti on until time showed whether tha t confidence was well placed ." Wong Ya ng Sung v.
~1 cG r a th . 339 U.S. 33. 55 ( 1950 ) U. Reed disse nting}.
' 313 U.S. 409 (1941 ) (the rourth or the Morga n series).
(' l d. at 42 1.
"33 6 F.2d 754.764 (D .C. C ir. 1964 ).
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general facts often become so clearly intertwined that they may be, in the
final analysis , nearly indistinguishable. 8
Bias as to general facts at issue in an agency proceeding will not be
grounds for a finding of illegal prejudgment. Professor Davis finds that
" Prejudgment of general facts of the kind that merge with points of view
concerning issues of law or policy is probably inevitable a nd cannot properly
be deemed a ground for disqualification ."9
Indeed, the notion of expertise suggests an understanding of facts gained
from experience combined with informed predispositions. lo According to
former Federal Trade Commissioner Elman: "Agency members .. . are expected to be experts, bringing to each case a specialized knowledge formed
by experience. Such knowledge and experience is not, and should not be,
confined to the record of a particular case ." II When an agency pursues an
investigation which will muster all relevant general facts and then weighs
these facts objectively-influenced only by opinion as to broad policy or legal
theory- in order to reach some general conclusions, then the administrative
process is working at its optimum . 12 Retrieving knowledge or opinions of
general facts for use in a proceeding relating to a specific party will not
constitute prejudgment.
A comparison of the holding in Safeway Stores, In c., et al. v. FTC13
with the decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,I4 two nearly identical
fa ctu a l situations, illustrates this point. In both cases, FTC Chairman
Dixon had acted as Chief Counsel for congressional investigations of the
respective industries before becoming Chairman of the FTC, and had in
both cases asked hostile questions of industry witnesses. Yet, in American
Cyanamid, but not in Safew ay Stores, Chairman Dixon was disqualified.
The Ninth Circuit in Safeway Stores distinguished the case before it from
American Cyanamid on the basis of the depth of the Chairman's inquiry
into specific facts which ultimately arose in the Commission' s proceeding. I S
The Court, in the case before it , refused " .. . to hold that , on the basis of
the questions asked of Continental' s president . . . prior to initiation of the
present proceedings, and not including a statement of opinion as to an
ultimate controverted issue which he would judge , a disinterested observer
would have reason to believe that he had prejudged the dispute. " 16 (Emphasis added .) Previously, the Sixth Circuit in American Cyanamid, also , found
that inquiry into the general issues would not have led to disqualification
and specifically limited its holding by the qualifying statement that , "[w]e
do not hold that the services of Mr. Dixon as counsel for the subcommittee,
standing alone , necessarily would require disqualification. Our decision is
I\" Whe n legis lat ive facts are used for th e creation of law or poli cy, the facts ohen merge w it h judgme nt in such a
way Ih a l a ny " ((e mp led se pa ra lion is bOlh im possib le a nd undesirab le." 2 D AV IS, § I S.03 a l 355.
' 2 D An s, §1 2.0 1 a l 144.
wR EICIl. Til E LAW Of Til E P L' ~~ED SOCIETY, 75 Va le L. J . 1227, 1242 ( 1966).
"ELMAN. A N OTE ON Am ll NlSTR A1W E A DJUDICATI O", 74 Va le L.J . 652, 653 ( 1965).
" M cF ARLAND, LA NDIS' R EPO RT: Til E VOICE Of O NE CRYING IN Til E WI LDE RNESS, 47 Va. L. Rev. 373, 433-35 (196 1).
"366 F .2d 79S (91h C ir. 1966).
"363 F .2d 757 (61h C ir . 1966).
" 366 F .2d a l 802.

"' Id.
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based upon the depth of the investigation a nd the questions and comments
by Mr. Dixon . . . . "1 7 Thus, previous co ntact with ge nera l facts , even where
it might evidence some opinion as to such facts, does not constitute illega l
prejudgment.
C. Judicial Sensitivity to Bias as to Specific Facts

An administrative agency must make its individual decisions based on
the record in a particular proceeding . IS Whereas admini strative officers may
apply predetermined policy , or prior knowledge of general facts, the y may
not rely on determinations of specific facts reached or suggested outside the
record of the individual proceeding. The guarantee of a hearing requires
a practicable opportunity to persuade as well as to speak.19 Thus, the possibility of bias as to specific facts must be closely examined. A comparison of
the holdings in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,20 and Skelly Oil v. Federal Power
Commission 21 demonstra tes judicial se nsitivity to ·allegations of bias as to
specific facts .
In Texaco, the FTC had issued complaints charging that Texaco had
coerced its dealers into selling Goodrich tires , and that the underl ying
agreements between Texaco and Goodrich were unlawful. During the period
of the hearing before the examiner, Chairman Dixon made a speech in which
he named Texaco a nd Goodrich, among others, In close connection with a
statement of practices alleged in the complaintY
While co nceding the Commissioner's right to hold certain views on
general policy,23 the Court held that Chairman Dixon's speech indicated
that he had formed opinions about the specific issues of the case before
hearing the appeal. It found that " . . . a disinterested reader of Chairman
Dixon 's speech could hardly fail to conclude that he had in some measure
decided in advance that Texaco had violated the Act. " 24
A different result on quite similar facts was reached by the Tenth
Circuit in the Skelly case. There, the Federal Power Commission was to
determine rates to be charged by a number of natural gas producers. The
action was brought under section 5 of the Natural Gas Act 25 which requires
the Commission to find that a rate is " unjust, unreasonable , unduly discriminatory, or preferential," before taking action. Prior to hearing before
the Federal Power Commission, Commissioner Black made a speech in which
he refuted the producers' claim that competition, not regulation , should
adjust rates . He stated, among other things , that the producers incorrectly
urged the existence of competition and that " [the} producer's plea that
competition be given a free hand is simply another way of letting the pro1'363 F.2d at 768.
"Universal Camera Corp. v.
Volpe. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

NLRB .

340

U.S.

474 (1951 );

19COMMEr'\T , PRE,I ll D ICE AND TilE Am.IINISTRATIVE PROGKt: SS,:; 9

'°336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"375 F.2d 6(10th Cir. 1967).
"Texaco. 336 F.2d at 759.

see

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. Inc. et al. v.

N .W . L. RE\', 216, 216- 17 (1964 ).

2)See discussion in Part A, Acceptance of Bias as to Genera l Policy a nd Lega l T heory.

"Texaco. 336 F.2d at 760.
"15 U.s.C. §717(d); 52 Stat. 823 (1938).
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ducers fix the prices instead of the FPC ."
The Court held that the Commissioner's statement did not require that
he be disqualified. It relied on the fact that he had not appeared to prejudge
the ultimate issue of a "j ust and reasonable rate. " The Court went on to
state:
In our opinion no basis for disqualification arises from the fact or assumption
tha t a member of an administrative agency enters a proceeding with advance views
on important eco nomic matters in issue . 26 (Emp hasis added.)

Hence, the key factor which distinguishes this case from Texaco is that the
FPC Commissioner's statements did not appear to prejudge specific facts in
the proceeding but only general issues, i.e., " important economic matters. "
Thus, it is not the "strong convictions" or "crystallized point of view"
on questions of law, policy, or general facts which disqualify a decisionmaker, but rather evidence of opinions with respect to specific facts in a
particular case before the agency for determination Y
THE KEY FACTOR: THE CONTEXT OF THE DE CISION MAKING

Despite the apparent judicial sensitivity to whether the issue alleged
to be prejudged might relate to specific facts , it is the premise of this article
that the key distinction is whether the bias is institutional or personal.
Courts will not find illegal prejudgment where the spectre of bias arises in
the context of an institutional process, whereas the charge will result in close
scrutiny of the decision where personal bias is alleged. 28
The case most often cited in support of a prejudgment challenge is
Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. 29 In that case,
one member of the Commission who had participated in the decision to
authorize a proceeding had been director of the bureau co nducting the investigation at issue during the time that it had initiated an informal investigation. The Commissioner filed a statement that he was not prejudiced by
his prior contact. However, the Court found that the statement evidenced
involvement in the investigation. 30 The Court held due process requires, at
least, "fair play " and that fairness demands that one who participated in the
" Skelly, 375 F.2d at 18.
" 2 DA VIS, §12 .01 , a t 130-34; American Cyanam id Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 764 -65 (6 th Cir . 1966).
The holding in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966), a lso hinges on a distinction between specific
facts and genera l facts . Although nOl a prejudgment case , it does give further indi ca tion of judicial sensitivity to possible
improper innuence on specific facts by considerations outside the record . Thus, a lthough the Court held that the Congress has a right to advise as to the "sense of Congress" concerning the Commissioner's legislative function, it went on to
state, " lhJowever , when [the congressiona lJ investigation focuses directly and substantially upon the mental decisional
processes of a Commission in a case w hich is pending befo re it, Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legislative function , but rather , in its judicial function. " [d. at 964. Thus, the Court disting uished influence on such things as
policy statements and rules from innuence on "adjudi ca tive" facts, and found th at the boundary had been passed in thi s
particular congressiona l investigation .

"cf 2 DAVIS § 11 .06, at 63-65.
" 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. C ir. 1962).
Wfhe same circuit on ly a year la ter severely limited the Amos Treat doctrine. In SEC v. R.A. H olman, 323 F.2d
284 (D .C. Cir .), cerl. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963), respondent sought to disqu a lify a Commissioner who had a position
of responsibilit y o n the staff but had not pa rticipa ted in the investiga tion . Presented with nearly the sa me fact situatio n,
the Court limited Amos Treat to its particular fact s. It sta ted that Amos Trea t was an exceptional case and it found suffi·

cient the Commissioner 's affidav it that he did not participate in the investigation. See Ma remon t Corp. v. FTC. 43 1 F.2d
124, 128 (7t h Cir. 1970).
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case on the side of a party not participate in the decisionmaking.31 It found
that the potential for prejudgment was too great where a Commissioner has
been both the prosecutor and the judge. The Court concluded that " ... an
administrative hearing of such importance and vast potential consequences
must be attended, not only with every element of fairness but with the very
appearance of complete fairness. "32
The foundation case for the line of cases emanating from Amos Treat
appears to be Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. National Labor Relations
Board. 33 In Berkshire, a Board member had written a letter to a customer of
the respondent which could be interpreted as soliciting his help in the union
boycott. The Court recognized that an "administrative body" must perform
certain duties which may prejudge issues in adjudication, but it found improper the above conduct of a member of the tribunal. The Court concluded
that "[ilf the circumstances alleged are proved Berkshire did not have a
hearing before an impartial tribunal, but one in which one member of the
body which made exceedingly important findings of fact had already thrown
his weight on the other side. "34
The leading case permitting preconception in administrative proceedings is FTC v. Cement Institute. 35 The alleged prejudgment arose from an
FTC Report to Congress on the cement industry which stated that the
cement industry's multiple basing point system was price fixing. Petitioner
charged that the FTC had engaged in investigation of facts outside the record
of the adjudication, and had communicated to Congress certain conclusions
which prejudged key issues in thL adjudication. The Court held that it could
not bar the whole Commission from hearing a fact\lally related case because
of expressed opinions formed as a result of its prior "official investigation."
The Court based this holding on presumption of objectivity of the institution:
"In the first place, the fact that the Commission had entertained such views
as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean
that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of respondent's basing point practices. "36 In further support of its holding, it
argued that to hold otherwise would mean that by carrying out its investigatory function the Commission would immunize violators. "Thus experience
acquired from their work as commissioners would be a handicap instead of
an advantage."37 This experience is one of the Commission's valuable resources, and hence, good reason compelled the Court to uphold the Commission action. 38

"Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"Amos Treat, 306 F.2d at 267.
"121F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941).
" /d. at 239.
"333 U.S. 683 (1948).
" /d. at 701.
"/d.at702 .
}8

Also, a simultaneous industrywide investigation will not disable the agency from proceeding in adj udication

against one industry member. Lehigh Portland Cement
416 F.2d 971 (4 th Cir. 1969).

v.

FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628 (D.E. D.Va. 1968),

aij 'd per curiam

224
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It could be argued that the Cem en t In stitute is merely another case in
which a court was willing to uphold the agency where only policy and genera l facts may have been prejudged. However, in Pangburn v. CAB,39 the First
Circuit rejected a challenge based upon prejudgment of specific facts . The
CAB started two proceedings to investigate an airline crash : one to investigate the crash and issue a public report, a nd another to determine whether
to suspend the pilot's license for fa ilure in skill. Prior to the conclusion of
the suspension proceeding, the Board found that the crash was the result of
pilot error. The pilot argued , quite plausibly, that the Board' s public findings in the accident investigation prejudged the very issue in the adjudication. However, the court found for the Board :
[W]e ca nnot say that the mere ract that a tribun a l has had co ntact with a
particular ractu a l complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has ta ken a public position
on the racts , is enough to place tha t tribunal under a constitutiona l inhibition to
pass upon the racts in a subseq uent hearing 4 0

Thus, the court had little trouble with a situation in which the various
institutional functions of the agency force it into a position fraught with the
potentia l for bias-even as to specific facts . It relied on the integrity of
institutiona l decisionmakers to assure " fair play" and cited 'a case in which
the Board had , indeed , reached two different opinions.41
The difference, then, between B erkshire and Am os Treat , and Cement
I nstitute and Pangburn must be the nature of the decisionmaking. Thus,
where individua l bias either exists or appears to exist the administrative
action has not been upheld , but where institutional bias is suggested by the
facts the action has been affirmed. 42
A comparison of the first and second Cinderella 43 cases demonstrates
the efficacy of the institutional/ persona l distinction . In the first Cinderella
case, the court explicitly relied on the institutional nature of a lleged prejudicial action relating to a specific case. The District Court had held that the
Commission could not issue "reason to believe" press releases in connection
with the initiation of an adjudication . One of its conclusions was that, " [t]he
Commission has the duty in a quasi-judicial proceeding to avoid prejudgment
or giving the appearance of having prejudged the issues involved in such
proceedings . "44
The Court of Appeals specifically rejected this holding. It found that it
was the duty of the Commission to inform consumers of any information it
became aware of which indicated unfa ir or deceptive practices.
[T] here is in ract and law authority in the Commission , acting in the public
interest, to a lert the public to suspected violations or the law by ractua l press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe tha t a respondent is
" 31 1 F.2d 349 (1st Cir . 1962) .
.ol d. at 358 .
'1 Id. at 356.
-42 Even Am os Treat and Berkshire indirectly support the distinction ; for t in both cases the court left open the possi ~
bility of future proceedings by the same age ncy without the disqualified member. These courts trusted the institutions
1

to right themselves and reach fair and untainted decisions.

" FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing School, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (First Cinderella); Cindrrella
Career & Fini shing School, Inc. v. FTC, 42 5 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Second Cinderella).
"Cinderell a Career & Finishing School, Inc. v. Federa l Trade Commission, 8 FTC Stal. & Dec. '470, 473 (D. D.C.
1967).
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engaged in activities made unlawful by the Act which have resulted in the initiation
of action by the Commission.';

In the second Cinderella case, Chairman Dixon made statements in a
speech which indicated that he considered certain practices illegal but did
not directly refer to the respondents. Typical of these statements is: " What
about carrying ads that offer college educations in five weeks, ... or becoming an airline's hostess by attending a charm school?"46 Basically, the Chairman had merely done what the first Cinderella case said the Commission
had a duty to do: he was informing the public of questionable practices.
Yet, the same Court chastised the individual agency member for his conduct.
In recognitIOn of the institutional/ personal distinction, the Court
stated that its affirmation of the Commission 's power to issue factual press
releases "does not give individual Commissioners license to prejudge cases
or to make speeches which give the appearance that the case has been prejudged. "47 Thus, the Court said:
There is a mar ked difference between the issuance of a press release which
states th at the Commission has filed a compla int because it has 'reaso n to believe'
tha t there have been violations, and statements by a Commissioner after a n appeal
has been filed which give the appearance that he has already prejudged the case and
that the ultima te determination of the merits will move in predestined grooves. While
these tw o si tu ations-Commission press releases a nd a Commissioner's predecision public statements-are similar in appeara nce, they are obviously of a different order of merit .'8 (Emphasis added. )

Although an argument can be made that law of the second Cinderella case
is questionable ,49 it has important doctrinal significance because of its explicit reliance on the institutional/individual distinction. 50
Nor is this doctrine limited to institutional decisions by a collegial
body .51 Courts seem just as inclined to uphold an institutional decision of an
individual decisionmaker reached in the performance of his duty. A factual
situation similar to Am os Treat was upheld in Eisler v. United States. 52
Eisler, an admitted communist, charged that the judge was biased because he
had, as Assistant Attorney General, participated in anti-communist investigations. The Court held that illegal prejudgment must be based on personal
bias and such bias did not arise from the facts alleged. 53 Similarly, the
"First Cinderella at 1314.
"Second Cmderella at 590.
Hid.

" Id.
4<)The primary thru st of the Court 's opi nion, in fact, concerned the appearance of prejudgment rather than prejudgment itse lf. The ho lding may be explained by reference to the fact that other similar cases were few in number and
had occurred several yea rs in the past. This fact , along wit h the close prox imit y of the speech (Q the Court 's decision in
the first Cinderella, co nfirmed the Court's view that" . . . the reasonab le inference a disinterested observer would g ive

these remarks would connect them inextricably with this case." Second Cinderella, at 590 n.IO. The Court seems to have
stretched the appearance test to include an inference of prejudgment of specific facts rather than the orthodox application of the test to g lean the appea rance of a fair hearing or impartia l mind .

IOThe distinction was recently recognized in Kennecoll Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972). In that

case the Court sa id that a charge that correspondence from the Commission itself with Congress made a fair hearing im·
went
be
Id.
sions by a n individual Commissioner which evide nced prejudgment of controverted issues , alt hough not found in this case ,

possible

to "the nature of the law itseW' and could not

upheld.

would lead to disqualification. Id. at 80.
" Bul see 2 DAVIS §11 .01.
"170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1948).
Sl id. at 278.

at 79. However, it did indicate that expres-
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Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp . et al. 54 refused to disqualify Judge Wyzanski for preliminary findings in hearing statements which
appeared contrary to the defend ant's position . In doing so, it relied on the
fact that the opinions were related to the Judge 's institutiona l duties a nd
hence were not the result of extraneous personal bias. 55 Administrative
agencies need meet no greater standard than judges,56 and hence , the holdings of these two cases apply equally as well to agency decisions Y
Indeed, similar reliance on the institutionalized decisionmaker has been
expressed with respect to individual administrative officers . In National
Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment CO. ,58 the hearing examiner
had excluded testimony in the initial hearing in the case. After a court held
that the testimony should have been heard and returned the case to the
agency, the same examiner, after hearing the testimony , found as he had
before. In reliance on the integrity of the institutional decisionmaker , the
Court upheld the examiner's decision and rejected the challenge of illega l
prejudgment. In MacKa y v. McAlexander,59 the same hearing officer who
presided at the deportation hearing was held qualified to preside at the hearing on suspension of deportation .60 The SlIpreme Court, in United States v.
Morgan, 61 relied on the institutional nature of the individual administrative
officer's decision . The case arose from a letter written by the Secretary of
Agriculture to the N ew York Tim es strongly criticizing a court decision on a
matter which was again before the Secretary. The potential for prejudgment
was clear, but the Court upheld the Secretary's second decision. In so doing,
the Court said " [t 1hat he not merely held , but expressed, strong views on
matters believed by him to have been in issue, did not unfit him for exercising
his duty . . . . "62 The Court assumed that in reaching an institutional decision in performance of his duty he would do so impartiall y, i.e., the presumption of regularity in institutional decisions.
Accordingly, official administrative action will withstand challenges
based on bias or the opportunity for bias so long as the decision is made in
the context of an institutional function . This conclusion is not affected by
whether the institutional decisionmaker is collegial or singular.
Two reasons are given for rejecting prejudgment challenges against an
" 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
" Id. at 583.
" e.g., NLRB v. Donnell y Ga rment Co. , 330 U.S. 219 , 236-37 (194 7); FTC v. Cement Institute , 333 U.S. 683 ,703
(1948).
S70ften cited in support of cha llenges of bias by administrative age ncies is the decision in In re Murchinson, 349
U .S. 133 ( 1955). That case involved a trial judge who found two witnesses in contempt in open court for prior statements

made in a grand jury. The Supreme Court held that the tria l judge could not be the complainant , indicter , prosecutor
and judge: " Having been a part of tha t laccusator yI process a judge ca nnot be , in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquitta l of these accused ." /d. a t 137. But where the fac ts were not as aggravated the
Supreme Court refused to find bias in a contempt conviction by a tr ia l judge. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385
(1957); Sacher et a l. v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) . Moreover , the very na ture of the administrative process compels agencies

to

perform dual functi ons, and hence, the ra ti onale of Murchinson seems tota ll y inapplica ble to adminis-

trative agencies.
" 330 U.S. 219 (1947).
" 268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960).
"'Id. at 39.
" 313 U.S. 409 (1941 ).
" Id. at 421.
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institutiona l decisionmaker. 63 The major reason is judicial reli ance on the
integrity of institutiona l decisionmakers . The courts presume that institutional decisionmakers will fairly operate the multiface ted administrative
systems which are often fr aught with opportunities for improper bias. Thus,
in Cement In stitute, the Supreme Court said, " . . . the fact that the CommlSSlOn has entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessaril y mean that the minds of its members are irrevocably closed on the subject. . . . "64 In Pangburn ,65 even though the Board
had previousl y expressed an opinion on the specific issue raised in the
adjudication, the Court found that the Board would not consider itself bound
by that opinion but would feel free to reach a contradictory opinion in the
adjudication . The second, and less importa nt, reason for such decisi ons is
the " rule of necessity. "66 Hence, in Pang burn, after finding reason for
placing its trust in the Board , the Court went on to say, " [i 1f we were to
accept petitioner's argument [that the accident .investiga tion disqua lified
the Board from considering suspension], it would mean that because the
Board obeyed the ma ndate of Section 701 , it was thereupon constitutiona lly
precluded from carrying out its responsibilities under Section 609 ."67
Even though courts have gone quite far to uphold official agency action ,
they have on occasion indicated that their tolerance has some boundaries.
In several cases, the courts have indicated a strong aversion to clear indications of actual prejudgment in official agency action . In Gilligan, Will &Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,68 the SEC had issued a press
release three days after initiation of an adjudication announcing that it had
found that the exact factual situation in issue in the adjudication was illegal
(as opposed to announcing a " reason to believe"). While refusing to overturn the Commission's action, the Court said :
. . . the Commission's reputation for objectivity and imparti a lit y is opened to
cha llenge by the adoption of a procedure fr om whi ch a disinterested observer may
conclude that it has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a par. ticular case in adva nce of hearing it. There would appear to be no such co nflict between the Commission's duty to inform the pu blic a nd its duty to prosecu te as would
necessitate the use of press releases of the kind here questioned [finding a violation] .69

Similarly, even though the Court in L ehigh Portland Cement v. FTOo
clearly upheld the FTC's right to consider the same issues in two different
proceedings (citing Pangburn 71 ), it reserved the right of judicial review if it
appeared, after the agency's action became final , that actual bias was
present. 72 In making this suggestion, the Court may have been merely enter"e.g., Cement Institute, p. 223 supra .
" 333 U.S. at 70 1.
" 3 11 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962 ).
" 2 DAVIS §12 .04; e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute , 333 U.S. a t 701 ; Pangburn v. CAB, 3 11 F .2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962);
Loughra n et al. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 431 , 433 (8th Cir . 1944).
67
311 F.2d at 358.
"267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
" Id. at 468-69 .
'"29 1 F. Supp. 628 (D .E. D.Va . 1968), aff'dpercuriam , 416 F.2d 97 1 (4th Cir. 1969) .
" Supra .
" 291 F. Supp. at 633 .
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ing the narrow groove cut by the Court in San Francisco Mining Exchange v.
SEC: 73
It may be that the Commission members in deciding this case on the merits,
made use of the staff report and other information that may have been brought to
their attention a t the time they were ca lled upon to determine if the proceeding
should be instituted . However, absent a ny factual basis for believing that the Commission made such use of these materials, as is the case here, a n inquiry into the
state of mind of administrative adjudi cators during the decisional process is wholly
improper71

Thus, the potential exists that a court may, at least, entertain a challenge of
prejudgment in official agency action upon the difficult and unlikely showing
of actual bias. Otherwise , such challenges should no longer be seriously considered .
CONCLUSION

Insofar as predispositions may exist in the more highl y charged field s in which
administrative agencies operate, they are mainl y the product of many factors of
mind a nd experience, and have comparativel y little relation to the ad ministrative
machinery. There is no si mple way of eliminating them by mere cha nge in the
administrati ve structure . They can onl y be exorcised by wise and self-controlled
men. The problem is inherentl y one of personnel and the traditions in which it is
trained. 75

Courts fa ced with the problems
seem to concur in the above finding
to Study Administrative Procedure.
tionalized , the courts have relied on
do "the right thing."

of administrative prejudgment would
of the Attorney General's Committee
For , where the decision is instituthe integrity of the men involved to

" 378 F.2d 162 (9th Gir. 1967).
" ld. a t 168 .
7S FINAL R EPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADM I NI STRATI VE PRO CEDURE, S. DOC. No . 8,

Gong., 1st Sess. at 59 (194 1).
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